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THE CHANDLER ACT-ITS EFFECT UPON THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY'
VINCENT L. LEIBELL, JR.t
History and Development of Bankruptcy Law
Legal historians unanimously agree that the fundamental concept of
bankruptcy law is not a new one. In fact it is conceded to be of very ancient
origin. But the exact time and place of its nativity has been the subject of
much conjecture.
Perhaps a long-forgotten king of Babylon was the first to espouse the principle
of debtor release.2 Or possibly the credit should go to the ancient Israelites.3
Yet again the renowned Athenian sage, Solon, whose name has become
synonymous for a wise legislator, may well have, first planted the seed of
bankruptcy law.4
Interesting as it may be to speculate on the time of its origin, those who deal
with the practical side of bankruptcy law have been content to place its source
in Roman Jurisprudence.5 Prior to the time of Julius Caesar insolvency was
looked upon as a crime calling for severe punishment.0 The Cessio Bonorum
modified the penalties inflicted on the debtor by permitting him to make an
assignment of his property for the benefit of creditors. Said assignment operated
as a release of debts only to the extent of the property surrendered. But it
definitely mitigated his unhappy lot by exempting him from imprisonment.7
We must pass over many centuries from the time of the Roman Conqueror
to the reign of King Henry VIII to find the immediate ancestor of our modern
streamlined bankruptcy law. The first English Bankruptcy Act appeared on
the statute books in the year 1542, under the significant title of An Act Against
Such Persons As Do Make Bankrupts.8 Applying only to traders, a condition
retained down to the days of Victoria,9 the Act dealt solely with fraudulent
debtors. This being so, naturally no provision providing for release from
debts was included. Perhaps the most important clause in the Act is the
t Class of 1940, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. Class of 1911 Prize Essay.
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submitted by a student in the senior class of the Law School on a legal subject to be
designated annually by the Dean. In the event that in any year no essay submitted Is
deemed worthy of the award, the income of the fund for that year will be devoted to
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following, "that is to say, to every of the said creditors, a portion rate and rate
like, according to the quantity of their debts."10 No longer did the law favor the
creditor who first might arrive on the scene and make off with the debtor's
effects. For the first time the assets, such as they might be, were to be dis-
tributed pro rata. This indeed was a valuable contribution to the substance
of bankruptcy law.
In 1570 during the reign of Queen Elizabeth the Parliament passed the
second of the English Bankruptcy Acts.'1 This law enlarged and made more
specific the Act of Henry VIII listing as it did certain offenses which would
subject the debtor to punishment. Remington in his admirable work on bank-
ruptcy, holds that these offenses "constituted what would now be denominated
acts of bankruptcy."'- Here again no provision was made for granting the
bankrupt a complete discharge.
Weathering a few minor changes, the English law of bankruptcy remained
substantially the same down to the reign of Queen Anne. In 1705 a radical
departure was made from the then well established principle of "let the debtor
beware", when the English Parliament, for the first time in modem history,
provided for discharge of the debtor from his remaining debts, on condition that
he comply with certain requirements set forth in the Act.' 3 Since Queen Anne's
Act every bankruptcy law has contained a provision granting debtor relief,
though the necessary prerequisites have varied considerably.' 4
Thus when the American Colonies declared their independence from the rule
of King George III in 1776, English bankruptcy legislation provided not only
for the pro rata distribution of the debtor's assets, but it also permitted the
debtor's discharge from remaining debts in certain limited situations. How-
ever, many years were to pass before the scope of bankruptcy law would be
broadened so as to include other than traders or to permit the initiation of
voluntary proceedings by the debtor.' 5 At this point, coinciding as it does
with the Declaration of Independence, we will cross the Atlantic and follow
the development of bankruptcy law in the United States.
Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress
shall have power ... to establish . .. uniform laws on the subject of bank-
ruptcies throughout the United States." This succinct statement has time and
again been referred to by our courts in upholding the legality of the various
bankruptcy laws passed since the Constitution was ratified in 1787. In the
absence of Congressional legislation on the subject of bankruptcy, states have the
power to pass insolvency laws. This power is very definitely a limited one,
for the Constitutional provision against impairment of contracts by the states
prevents the application of such insolvency laws to debts or obligations con-
10. See note 8 supra.
11. 13 Eliz. Ch. 7 (1570).
12. 1 Rmnrm-mox, BAwxupTc (4th ed., 1934) 10.
13. 4 Anne Ch. 17.
14. 165 Fed. 588, 590 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903).
15. 298 U. S. 513, 535 (1936).
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tracted prior to the date of enactment. 6 Furthermore no state insolvency law
may discharge a debtor from obligations owing to creditors of other states,
unless by voluntarily submitting they grant the state jurisdiction over them.
When Congress enacts bankruptcy legislation all state insolvency laws are sus-
pended to the extent of actual conflict with it.17
The power of Congress to enact bankruptcy legislation lay dormant until the
year 1800.18 The immediate cause of the first Bankrutpcy Act was the depression
of 1798. In this it differed not from its successors, for all of our national
bankruptcy acts have followed closely upon economic depressions.'0
The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was restricted by its own terms to five years.
It survived a little over three years. The vote of 99 to 13 for repeal in the House
of Representatives is indicative of its unpopularity. 20 The Act itself followed
rather closely the English law of the time, differing principally in the fact that
it was made available not only to traders but also to merchants, underwriters,
and brokers.
Mr. Justice Livingston, in 1817, expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of
the extension of the law so as to include other than traders.21 In later years
this doubt was overcome and subsequent bankruptcy acts were made available
to additional classes of persons. 22
It was not until 1841, after public sentiment had crystalized as a result of the
financial panic of 1837, that the second of our national bankruptcy acts was
forced through Congress. The opposition protested most strongly against that
section which permitted voluntary bankruptcies. Representative Trumbul
arguing against its inclusion said, "Voluntary bankruptcy is a new term. Who
ever heard such language before? Under this bill discharge of the debtor is the
thing principally aimed at. Under previous acts, surrender of property was the
chief object." 23 Apparently Congress was none too sympathetic to the proposed
bill and it was only after skillful political manuevering by Henry Clay on behalf
of the Whigs that passage was secured.24
The Act itself made a court of bankruptcy available for the first time to
bankers, factors, and marine insurers. Already we may note the gradual ex-
tension of the operation of bankruptcy law so as to include new classes of
debtors. Indeed "the discharge of the debtor has come to be an object of no
less concern than the distribution of his property." 25 Progressive and workable
though it was, this, our second national bankruptcy act, was short lived. In
16. U. S. CONST. ACT. I, § 10; 4 Wheat. 122, 191 (U. S. 1819); 298 U. S. 513, 531 (1936).
17. 245 U. S. 605, 613 (1917).
18. Bankruptcy Act of 1800.
19. 295 U. S. 555, 581 (1935).
20. WARRm, BANKuPrcY IN U. S. HSTORY 19.
21. 1 Fed. Cas. No. 66 (C. C. N. Y. 1817).
22. 298 U. S. 513, 535 (1936) ; 185 U. S. 181, 184 (1901) ; 295 U. S. 555, 587 (1935).
23. WARR.N, BANKRUPTCY iN U. S. HISTORY 72.
24. Id. at 76, 77.
25. 295 U. S. 555, 588 (1935).
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less than two years from the time it was enacted it was repealed, falling during
the turbulent days of the States' Rights controversy.20
It was not until a quarter of a century after the repeal of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1841, that Congress passed another bankruptcy law. The severe financial
convulsion resulting from the Civil War was the immediate cause of its enact-
ment. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 survived until the year 1878. It was in no
sense a model law. Remington justifiably criticises the Act because,
"It was too easy to throw a debtor into bankruptcy and too hard for him to obtain
his discharge after he once became bankrupt, there were so many grounds named in
the Act for declaring a debtor bankrupt, and so many for preventing his discharge."-
Among the objections to the law was one that had been leveled against all its
predecessors, this being the distance that the Federal Courts were located from
many debtors, claimants, and witnesses.a When we recall the nature of trans-
portation in the nineteenth century, it is apparent that the objection carried
much weight. Another serious evil was the "most vicious fee system."-m Creditors
of small estates received nothing, while the assets of large estates were seriously
depleted by excessive charges.
Before passing on to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, we should take note of the
inception of a new provision in American bankruptcy law. Embodied in the
form of an amendment to the Act of 1867, Congress in 1874 provided for
compositions. As can readily be understood, grave doubts were expressed as
to the amendment's constitutionality. Here indeed was a new and important
change. It was not until 1881 that the Supreme Court in the case of Wilmot v.
Mudge, recognized the constitutionality of compositions,o Our bankruptcy law
was coming of age.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
Twenty years after the repeal of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, Congress
enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Though often amended during the past
forty-two years it is still the law of the land. Even the famous Chandler Act
is no more than the most recent revision of the Act of 1898.
Passage of the Act, following in the wake of the financial debacle of 1893,
was secured only after a long and strenuous Congressional struggle. Southern
Congressmen felt that a bankruptcy law was a tool of Wall Street used by
creditors of the North to beat down the debtor class of the South.3 ' To
alleviate some of this prejudice, farmers and wage earners were specifically
exempted from being adjudged involuntary bankrupts. 2
No attempt will be made at this point to give a detailed outline of the Act
26. 1 REmmGTmo, BANYmuPscy (4th ed. 1934) 15.
27. Id. at 16.
28. 114 Fed. 222, 224 (W. D. AIiss. 1902).
29. 114 Fed. 222, 224 (1902); 174 Fed. 634, 637 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909).
30. 103 U. S. 217 (1880).
31. WAmu, BAxxmun'c n U. S. HasroRy 135-139.
32. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 4b, 11 U. S. C. 22.
1940]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
itself, because in discussing the Chandler Act, the subject of this paper, much
would of necessity have to be repeated. It will suffice to indicate the major
defects of former bankruptcy laws which Congress tried to overcome in this Act.
The oft-repeated and justifiable charge that the federal courts were too far
away for most of the people interested in bankruptcy proceedings was met with a
provision for at least one referee for each county.83
"The oppressive and expensive features" 34 of former acts were iubstantially
mitigated by provisions limiting the compensation of those who performed duties
for the court. Remington comments that,
"Indeed the whole spirit of the Act of 1898 breathes economy in administration and
makes of this law a peculiarly business law."30
Salutary as the economy provisions are, one cannot feel but that there is, even
at this late date, room for further improvement.
It will be recalled that under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, it was not difficult
to find a reason to force a debtor into bankruptcy, but it was exceedingly
difficult for the debtor once adjudicated to obtain his discharge. Congress in
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 very wisely limited the number of Acts of Bank-
ruptcy_ 3 7 and the grounds for denying a discharge. 8
No list of improvements brought about by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
would be complete without reference to the new definition of insolvency pro-
mulgated by Congress. 9 No longer could a debtor be thrown into bankruptcy
because of his inability to meet his obligations as they matured. The test,
henceforth, would be whether or not his assets, at a fair valuation, should be
found to be less than his liabilities. Thus a temporary stringency in the money
market could not be seized upon by creditors to cause the bankruptcy of
debtors, who if they could readily liquidate their holdings, would be found to
be solvent.
Prior to the passage of the Chandler Act the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 bad been
amended on numerous occasions. Space will not permit a complete discussion
of these amendments. Generally speaking, they expanded the concept of bank-
ruptcy administration. For example, in 1910 corporations were permitted to
file voluntary petitions in bankruptcy.4  Then on March 3, 1933, the last day
of the Hoover Administration, a section was inserted in the Act providing for
the reorganization of railroads engaged in interstate commerce. 41  This was
33. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 34, 11 U. S. C. 62.
34. 114 Fed. 222 (W. D. Miss. 1902).
35. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 40, 11 U. S. C. 68. See also 19 F. Supp. 120, 122 (E. D.
Ky. 1937).
36. 1 REMINGTON, BANxRUpTcy (4th ed. 1934) 17.
37. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 3a, 11 U. S. C. 21.
38. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 14b, 11 U. S. C. 32.
39. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 1, sub. 15, 11 U. S. C. 1.
40. Bankrutpcy Act of 1898, §4a, 11 U. S. C. 22.
41. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 77, 11 U. S. C. 205.
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followed in the next year by the enactment of the famous Section 77B, which
remedied many of the defects of the old equity receivership system.
Pausing at this point, before proceeding into our study of the Chandler Act,
and looking back over the past history of bankruptcy legislation, we observe
that this phase of the law has not remained static but rather has been dynamic
and responsive to the needs of the time. A progressive liberalization both on
the part of the legislatures and of the courts has changed a system of law con-
ceived in the theory that bankruptcy is a crime to one where compositions and
creditor control have risen to the point of paramount importance. Rehabilita-
tion not wanton destruction, has become the keynote of bankruptcy legislation.
Origin and Purpose of The Chandler Act
Unlike much recent legislation, the Chandler Act was not the result of any
sudden pressure or desire to meet an emergency. WThen it was finally'presented
to Congress, it had behind it years of research and discussion. In the words of
its sponsor, "It is a composite, representing a consensus of men thoroughly
familiar with the subject, and approaching the problems presented from every
viewpoint-the court and its administrative officers, the bar, the creditor, the
debtor, the public, the law-text writer, the law-school instructor, and the
economist."42
Soon after the amendments of 1926 were enacted, many suggested a further
revision of the law. It was urged among other things, that a modernization
providing for prompter administration and limitations on creditor control would
be to the interest of all conncerned.43
In 1929 as a result of certain indictments handed up by a grand jury investi-
gating bankruptcy frauds, a searching inquiry conducted by Judge Thacher of
the Southern District of New York, was begun.
In 1930, after Judge Thacher had become Solicitor General of the United
States, the Department of Justice made a comprehensive survey of the situation
pursuant to a Presidential Order of July 29, 1940.
The report of the Department of Justice, dated December 5, 1931, recom-
mended that measures be taken designed: "l-to make the Bankruptcy Act more
effective as a medium of distribution; 2-to make the discharge provisions of the
law just and effective;3-to discover fraud and waste; and 4-to secure more
perfect administration."44
The Hastings-Michener Bill, introduced in Congress in April of 1932, at-
tempted to give effect to these recommendations. Apparently, there were two
objections that carried such weight as to lead to the Bill's rejection. These were
the fear "that it might build up a bureaucracy whose inefficiency might equal
the inefficiency of the weak' spots of the existing system,"1i  and that a complete
42. H. R. No. 1409, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) 3.
43. Id. at 2.
44. Ibid.
45. Hearings before Judidary Committee on H. R. 6439 subsequently reported H. R.
8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 10.
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revision would destroy the value of court decisions handed down over a long
period of time.46
Following the rejection of the- Hastings-Michener Bill, a nationwide group of
men interested in bankruptcy law formed themselves into an organization known
as the National Bankruptcy Conference. This body of men did invaluable
work in formulating, debating, and refining proposed amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898. Representative Chandler himself attested to this when he
said that he "found a very comprehensive draft of a Bill which had been drawn
by the National Bankruptcy Conference and I made that draft the basis for the
first Bill that was introduced." 47
The Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives held extensive hear-
ings on the Bill commencing in April of 1935. Add to this, the hearings held
by the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate and the research and
recommendations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and one is struck
with the thoroughness and comprehensiveness of the preparation which pre-
ceded the passage of the Chandler Act in June of 1938.
The general purpose the authors of the Chandler Act had in mind was, in the
words of Representative Chandler "to modernize and bring up to date the
bankruptcy law of our country. '48 Former United States District Judge George
E. Q. Johnson subdivides this purpose in the following manner: "a-clarification;
b-improvement of administrative processes; c-granting new privileges to
honest but unfortunate debtors; d-minimizing evasions by dishonest debtors;
e-perfecting the sections relating to fraudulent conveyances, preferences, and
liens; f-improving the partnership section; g-eliminating inconsistent and
overlapping provisions of the 'Debtors' Relief' portions of the Act; and h-pro-
viding for wage-earners' and real property arrangements. '49
The Chandler Act
In discussing the Chandler Act we must remember that Congress intended it
only as a revision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The latter was not repealed.
Thus the court decisions, interpreting the Act of 1898 during the past forty
years have not been rendered impotent. They remain quite vital in deter-
mining the meaning and value of sections of the old Act that remain the same
as they were prior to June 22, 1938.
No attempt will be made in this paper to list and discuss every change in
our bankruptcy law occasioned by the Chandler Act. At best we hope to point
out and evaluate the more important innovations. Naturally, much attention
will be shown to the so-called "Debtor-Relief" sections, for therein lies the
very heart and substance of the Chandler Act.
The referees in bankruptcy took on a new position of importance with the
46. H. R. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 2.
47. Hearings before Sub-Committee, Judiciary Committee, Sen. Rep. 75th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1937) 2.
48. H. R. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 3.
49. 8 C. J. S. 17 (Supp.).
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advent of the Chandler Act. Re-defining the word "court" so that it -hall
include not only the district judge but the referee in bankruptcy,*0 Congress
indicated that henceforth new functions would be exercised by the latter.
The referee has been given wide jurisdiction, particularly in Chapter X1 proceed-
ings. Here he has the power to confirm, refuse to confirm, set aside or
modify arrangements5 This is also true as regards the similarly constituted
Chapter XH52 and XIII.53 However, corporate reorganizations under Chap-
ter X are still primarily within the domain of the district judges. Under the
straight bankruptcy as distinguished from the "Debtor-Relief" sections of the
Act, the referee has received increased authority. His is the power to adjudi-
cate one a bankrupt or to dismiss the petition.r4  In addition, be may allow,
refuse, or revoke discharges.m5 The referee's acts are always subject to review
by the district judges who thus sit in an appellate capacity.
Courts of bankruptcy are now authorized to remove trustees upon their own
motion.56 Formerly it was necessary for creditors to petition for the removal
of trustees. This provision gives the court a strong hand in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, one that can be used to the advantage of all concerned.
The ancillary jurisdiction of courts of bankruptcy was prior to the Chandler
Act in a confused state. Actually nothing is added to the substance of the law
involved herein; however, the restatement on this point as contained in the
Chandler Act has done much to clarify the situation.IJ
Prior to the enactment of the Amendatory Act much expense and delay was
occasioned in bankruptcy proceedings because of the necessity of bringing
plenary suits against certain non-bankruptcy trustees, receivers or assignees
for the benefit of creditors, who refused to turn over property of the debtor in
their possession. Section 2 subdivision 21 not only permits summary proceed-
ings culminating in a turnover order directed against such persons, but also,
save in cases involving corporate reorganizations and real property arrange-
ments, permits the court to require an accounting from the person against whom
the turnover order was directed, provided possession was obtained within four
months prior to the date of bankruptcy.
In reality this section enlarges on rules laid down by the Supreme Court prior
to the enactment of the Chandler Act. In 1933 in the case of Gross v. Irving
Trust Co.,5 s the court held that, the supervention of bankruptcy proceedings
50. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 1, sub. 9, 11 U. S. C. 1.
51. Bankruptcy Act of 1893, § 366, 11 U. S. C. 766; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 386,
11 U. S. C. 786.
52. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 472, 11 U. S. C. 872; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 511,
11 U. S. C. 911.
53. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 65-6, 11 U. S. C. 1056; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 671,
11 U. S. C. 1071.
54. Bankruptcy Act of 1893, § 66 sub. 1, 11 U. S. C. 106.
55. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 66 sub. 6, 11 .L S. C. 106.
56. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 2 sub. 17, 11 U. S. C. 11.
57. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 2 sub. 20, 11 U. S. C. 11.
58. 289 U. S. 342 (1933).
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within four months of the commencement of a suit in a state court in which
receivers had been appointed, deprived the state court of the power to fix the
compensation of said receivers. Such power lies in a court of bankruptcy.
Again in 1935 the Supreme Court ruled that a state court receiver is not an
adverse claimant as to an allowance for services awarded after the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy. 9 Such an allowance is subject to a summary turnover
order by the court of bankruptcy.
In amending Section 3a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Congress moved cau-
tiously lest it upset one of the oldest traditions in the law of bankruptcy, namely,
that an Act of Bankruptcy must be alleged in every petition seeking an in-
voluntary adjudication of a debtor. One writer in a legal periodical has expressed
the idea in the following manner:
"While the act of bankruptcy concept is a vestigial remnant in the body of the law
and not only useless but highly obstructive to its modem purposes, its excision at the
present time would involve serious complications." 60
While a few acts of bankruptcy have been reshuffled the only substantial
change in Section 3a concerns the addition of equitable insolvency-inability to
pay debts as they mature-to legal insolvency as a condition precedent to alleg-
ing 3a (5) as an act of bankruptcy.
It is interesting to note that Congress still maintains, as indeed does the
Supreme Court by virtue of a five to four decision,0 ' that a debtor who has
passively "suffered or permitted" certain situations to develop, has been guilty
of an act of bankruptcy. Apparently, in bankruptcy law at least, "An Act"
has lost its affirmative connotation.
Section 3b has been amended by the Chandler Act so that with respect to
the first, second, or fourth acts of bankruptcy, the four months period does not
commence to run until after the transfer or assignment has become so far
perfected as to exclude the superior rights of bona fide purchasers.
The clarifying purpose of the Act is well illustrated in the last sentence that
has been added to Section 4b. Formerly there was much dispute as to whether
an individual's status as a farmer or wage-earner should be determined as of
the time of the commission of the act of bankruptcy or as of the time the obliga-
tion was incurred. Following a district court decision0 2 handed down many years
ago, Congress resolved the dispute in favor of the former.
In 1925 the Supreme Court held that a partnership could not be adjudged a
bankrupt upon a petition filed against it by one of its members without the
consent of the other partners. 3 The Chandler Act changes this rule by estab-
lishing a hybrid standard-that is a cross between a voluntary and an involun-
tary petition. Allowing less than all the general partners to file a petition,
59. 293 U. S. 470 (1934).
60. Treiman, Act of Bankruptcy (1938) 52 HARV. L. REV. 189, 210.
61. 183 U. S. 191 (1901).
62. 199 Fed. 363 (D. C. Mont. 1912).
63. 268 U. S. 426 (1925).
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the Amendatory Act requires an allegation of insolvency but precludes the
necessity for an act of bankruptcy.
In an attempt to minimize evasions by dishonest debtors, Congress imposed
new duties upon bankrupts. It is now mandatory for a bankrupt to appear at
the first meeting of creditors and at such other times as the court shall order.
Prior to this first meeting of creditors, bankrupts must furnish a complete state-
ment of financial condition. A most salutary change requires a bankrupt, upon
order of the court, to file a detailed inventory showing the cost to him of his
assets as of the date of his bankruptcy.04
Formerly it was necessary for an adjudicated bankrupt to file, within a pre-
scribed period, an application for his discharge. On occasions, due either to
the fault of the bankrupt or his attorney, the time limit would expire and the
bankrupt would be barred from obtaining his release. Section 14 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, now provides that "The adjudication of any
person, except a corporation, shall operate as an application for a discharge."
It was not an unknown practice in the past for a number of small creditors
to band together and block the election of trustees desired by creditors with
more substantial claims. In order to prevent such abuses, Congress decreed that
all claims of $50 or less should not be counted in computing the number of
creditors, voting or present at creditors meetings, but should be counted in com-
puting the total amount.05
The Chandler Act clarifies the definition of a voidable preference by providing
that the trustee may avoid any preference received by a creditor, who had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time when the
transfer was made. Wherever a preference is voidable the trustee may recover
the property involved, or if it has been converted, its value, except where a
bona fide purchaser has intervened, in which event if said bona fide purchaser
has given less than fair value, he shall have a lien upon the property, but only
to the extent of the consideration actually given.00
A new subsection has been added by the Chandler Act dealing with situations
where the bankrupt is a stockholder.0 7 It is particularly noteworthy because
it overrules at least two well-known Supreme Court decisions. Back in 1908 the
Court ruled that a stockbroker is not the owner of the shares of stock that he
purchases and holds for his customers on margin.c3 But rather he is a mere
pledgee. Consequently it is not a preferential transfer for an insolvent stock-
broker, in such a position, to turn over to his customer the shares of stock so
held. The Court went further and added, "Nor is the right to repledge incon-
sistent with ownership of the stock in the customer.' 'co
Under the rule laid down in Gorian v. Littlefidd and Duel v. Holins"
64. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 7, 11 U. S. C. 25.
65. Bankrutpcy Act of 1898, § 56c, 11 U. S. C. 92.
66. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 60b, 11 U. S. C. 96.
67. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 60e, 11 U. S. C. 96.
68. 209 U. S. 365 (1908).
69. 209 U. S. 365, 379 (1903).
70. 229 U. S. 19 (1913).
71. 241 U. S. 523 (1916).
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stock of each corporation was to be treated separately when found in the
possession of an insolvent stockbroker. However, now according to the terms
of Section 60e all securities held by the insolvent broker for his customers
are to constitute a single fund, except such as were allocated to or physically
set aside for a particular customer prior to insolvency and remained in such
condition at the date of bankruptcy.
The authors of the Chandler Act included therein the substance of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act that has been adopted in many states.72 It was a
wise move and should prove to be of great value in bringing to justice those
dishonest bankrupts who feel, since charity begins at home, that they should
leave nothing but the dregs of their unsuccessful enterprises for their creditors.
Indeed the sections intended to remove the dangers of preferential transfers
would be of little value if no provision was made to deter fraudulent convey-
ances. For while a preferential transfer must be made to a creditor, a fraudulent
transfer may be made to anyone. 73
In the closing hours of the Hoover Administration, Congress amended the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 by adding a chapter entitled, Provisions for the Relief
of Debtors.74 Since 1910 compositions had been effected under Section 12 of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended. However, it was first necessary for
the debtor to file a bankruptcy petition. A composition might thereafter be
granted without a formal adjudication. Under the terms of the amendment of
March 3, 1933 the debtor is not required to file a petition in bankruptcy prior to
seeking a satisfactory composition agreement. Thus, during the proceedings he
continues to be known as the "debtor", never as the "bankrupt." The constitu-
tionality of composition provisions, made binding on non-assenting creditors,
has frequently been tested. The courts have repeatedly held them valid.7"
A popular misconception of a composition makes it synonymous with an ex-
tension. The distinction is important and appropriate to consider here, because
the remainder of the Chandler Act deals exclusively with the Debtor-Relief pro-
visions. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has defined these
terms in succinct fashion as follows:
"A composition by creditors with their debtor in bankruptcy is an agreement between
them that the latter will pay down and the former will accept a named per cent
of their claims in full satisfaction" ;76
"An extension proposal is an agreement on the part of -the creditors that they will
extend the time within which their claims are probably to be paid, in full as to
secured creditors, on the terms proposed by the debtor and approved by the court." 77
72. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 67d, 11 U. S. C. 107.
73. 6 F. Supp. 58 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
74. Chap. VIII of Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended as it existed prior to Chandler Act.
75. 273 U. S. 380 (1927); 265 U. S. 269 (1924); 237 U. S. 447 (1915); 103 U. S. 217
(1880).
76. 91 F. (2d) 655, 658 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937).
77. Id. at 659.
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The first of the Debtor-Relief provisions, dealing with Agricultural Composi-
tions and Extensions, will not be the subject of a very detailed analysis in this
paper for while it is a part of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, it is
not a part of the Amendatory Act of June 22, 1938 known as the Chandler Act.
Enacted into law on March 3, 1933, Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, as amended, aimed to save the farmer-debtor from the clutches of creditors
who desired to distribute his property. Section 75 is emergency legislation, but
its life was extended for another four years by an act of Congress approved on
March 4, 1940. It authorizes the farmer to obtain a composition or extension
from his creditors. In actual practice this section has proved of little assist-
ance to the hard-pressed farmer for it is necessary that the composition or
extension agreement be acceptable to a majority in number and amount of his
creditors. Usually the greatest portion of a farmer's total debt consists of
the mortgage on his farm, so that the mortgagee is often in a position to bar
any agreement.
Aware of the great influence wielded by the mortgagee, Congress in 1934 added
sub-section S to section 75. The amendment was commonly known as the
Frazier-Lemke Act. The farmer was given the right, after he had failed to
obtain a composition or extension, to petition that he be adjudged a bankrupt.
The bankrupt farmer was then given the privilege of re-purchasing his farm,
at an appraised value, over a period of six years. If the secured creditors should
object to this procedure, the farmer was granted a moratorium.
In May of 1935 the Supreme Court held Section 75s (the Frazier-Lemke Act)
unconstitutional 78 Mr. Justice Brandeis writing for the court pointed out that
the bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive powers of Congress is
subject to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
"No instance has been found" wrote Mr. Justice Brandeis, "except under the Frazier-
Lemke Act, of either a statute or decision compelling the mortgagee to relinquish the
property to the mortgagor free of the lien unless the debt was paid in full.!"3C
In brief this Act was declared unconstitutional because it deprived secured
mortgagees of certain rights in particular property. To be specific, these rights
were five in number: 1-the right to insist on full payment before releasing the
lien; 2-the right to an auction sale; 3-the right to bid at the sale; 4-the
right to select the time for the sale with the consent of the court; 5-the right
to control the property during the period of default, subject to the discretion
of the court, and to have the rents and profits collected by a receiver for the
satisfaction of the debt.
In August of 1935 Congress passed a new Frazier-Lemke Act in which an
attempt was made to irradicate the constitutional defects prevalent in the first
Act. When this new Act was tested in the Supreme Court, it was held consti-
tutional o0 but first it was deemed necessary to construe it in the light of Con-
78. 295 U. S. 555 (1935).
79. 295 U. S. 555, 579 (1935).
80. 300 U. S. 440 (1937).
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gressional debates, because "the language of the Act is not free from doubt."8 1
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, provides for the re-
organization of railroads engaged in interstate commerce. Passed in 1933 it was
amended in 1935 and 1936. It is not a part of the Chandler Act.
Under the provisions of Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act railroads are pro-
hibited from being adjudicated bankrupts either voluntarily or involuntarily.
However, under Section 77 railroads engaged in interstate commerce, may have
their debt structures scaled down while masquerading as "tweedledum" debtor
instead of "tweedledee" bankrupt.
The constitutionality of Section 77 was upheld by the Supreme Court in the
case of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock
Island and Pacific Ry. Co.,82 decided in 1935. In the opinion of the court, Mr.
Justice Sutherland sets forth the argument for making reorganization proceed-
ings available to railroads.
"A railway is a unit; it cannot be divided up and disposed of piecemeal like a stock
of goods. It must be sold, if sold at all, as a unit and as a going concern. Its
activities cannot be halted because its continuous, uninterrupted operation is necessary
in the public interest; and for the preservation of that interest as well as for the pro-
tection of the various private interests involved, reorganization was evidently regarded
as the most feasible solution whenever the corporation had become insolvent or
unable to meet its debts as they mature."8 3
The next debtor-relief provision found in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as
amended, is Chapter IX, entitled Composition of Indebtedness of Local Taxing
Agencies. This Chapter like the preceding sections granting relief to farmers
and railroads, is not a part of the Chandler Act. However, passing note must
be taken of it so that we may better evaluate the r6le of the following debtor
relief sections that are part and parcel of the Chandler Act. Permitting munici-
palities and taxing districts to consummate debt readjustments, it has been
declared constitutional by the Supreme Court,84 unlike its predecessor the Muni-
cipal Debt Readjustment Act which failed to pass the scrutiny of the Court,
because the federal government was allowed to encroach upon the fiscal powers
of a sovereign state.8 5 The accent in Chapter IX is upon voluntary agreements
between the parties.
Chapter X of the Chandler Act has received such publicity in the public press
and in law review periodicals that it has, in the layman's mind, dwarfed into
insignificance the remaining sections of this Amendatory Act. It is bankruptcy
law arrayed in its most spectacular garments. It creates a legal display of rare
appeal.
Corporate reorganizations, as we now know them, are of relatively recent
origin, making their first appearance on our statute books in the year 1933. How-
81. 300 U. S. 440, 463 (1937).
82. 294 U. S. 648 (1935).
83. 294 U. S. 648, 671 (1935).
84. 304 U. S. 27 (1938).
85. 298 U. S. 513 (1936).
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ever, the reorganization of corporations had been effected for many years prior
to this time through the medium of the much abused equity receivership.
A creature, born of necessity, the equity receivership made its debut as an
instrumentality of corporate reorganization in the latter part of the nineteenth
century. A few newly built railroads of the expansion era soon found themselves
in the toils of financial insolvency. Naturally the public interest could not permit
their dismemberment, so the federal court resolved the difficulty by resort to
an old equitable form. The court would appoint a receiver to take charge of the
assets of the debtor and to forestall action on the part of the creditors. A sale
of the properties held by the receiver would then be effected to the creditors
free of debts. Said properties were then conveyed by the creditors to a new
corporation, usually possessing a similar name. Those creditors who acquiesced
in the proceedings accepted stock in the new corporation and those who refused
were paid partially in cash obtained from the sale of securities to new specu-
lators.
No doubt the equity receivers often proved cumbersome and expensive.
It was necessary that ancillary receivers be appointed to hold property of the
bankrupt lodged in other jurisdictions. Again the courts of bankruptcy had little
authority which could be exercised over the contesting parties. Compensation
to be received by committees and their attorneys were not subject to review
by the courts.8 6
With the enactment of Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, pertaining to the
reorganization of railroads, in 1933, Congress for the first time brought re-
organization procedure within the scope of the bankruptcy power. In 1934
statutory reorganization was made available to industrial corporations with the
advent of the well-known Section 77B.
Some of the changes wrought by Section 77B are worth noting here. Of
primary importance was the provision granting one court jurisdiction. Ancillary
receiverships were thereby rendered useless. Two-thirds of the creditors could
bind a dissenting minority by agreeing to a fair and equitable plan. No longer
was it necessary to pay off in cash obdurate creditors. Another provision of
77B, and this is of debatable value, allowed the debtor to remain in control of
his business.
Chapter X is more than an amendment to Section 77B. It supersedes it.
Consequently a thorough discussion of Chapter X is in order.
Any corporation save: a-municipal, insurance or banking corporations or a
building and loan association; and b-a railroad corporation that may obtain
relief under Section 77, may avail itself of Chapter X.P7 First, however, the cor-
poration must set forth facts in its petition indicating why it cannot obtain
adequate relief under Chapter XI pertaining to "Arrangements. 's3 A dissolved
corporation may not initiate reorganization proceedings since it has ceased to
exist.89 However, it would seem that the creditors of a dissolved corporation
S6. 282 U. S. 311 (1931).
87. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 105 (3), 11 U. S. C. 506.
88. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 130 (7), 11 U. S. C. 530.
89. 302 U. S. 120 (1937).
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may petition for reorganization. Incidentally, the cases determining the last
two points were decided under Section 77B, but since Chapter X has made no
affirmative change, they serve to indicate that all former judicial opinions have
not been rendered valueless.
Reorganization proceedings may be of a voluntary or involuntary nature. If
involuntary the petition must be signed by three or more creditors whose claims
aggregate at least $5,000. Said claims must be liquidated as to amount and
not contingent as to liability.0 1
Upon the approval of a petition the district court has all the jurisdiction,
powers, and duties possessed by a bankruptcy court after adjudication or of an
equity court upon the appointment of an equity receiver.02
"If no bankruptcy proceeding is pending, an original petition may be filed with the
court in whose territorial jurisdiction the corporation has had its principal place of
business or its principal assets for the preceding six months or for a longer portion of
the preceding six months than in any other jurisdiction."0 3
However, if the interests of the parties will best be served, the court may
transfer the proceedings to another district, as was done in the case of the
Associated Gas and Electric Company whose reorganization is now pending in
the District Court for the Southern District of New York.0 4
If a petition has been filed in "good faith", the Judge must approve it. If
not, he must disapprove it.9 5 A petition will be deemed to have been filed not
in "good faith" if (1) the petitioning creditors have acquired their claims for
the purpose of filing the petition; (2) adequate relief would be obtainable by
a debtor's petition under the provisions of Chapter XI of the Act; (3) it is
unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected; or (4) a
prior proceeding is pending in any court and it appears that the interests of
creditors and stockholders would be best subserved in such prior proceeding.00
The petitioner has the burden of establishing good faith. 7  Since the above
mentioned instances evidencing bad faith in no way limit the generality of the
meaning of the term "good faith",98 it is primarily a question of fact to be
decided by the Bankruptcy Court.9 9
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (now Mr. Justice)
William 0. Douglas has said that,
90. 76 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
91. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 126, 11 U. S. C. 526.
92. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 114, 11 U. S. C. 514; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 115,
11 U. S. C. 515.
93. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 128, 11 U. S. C. 528.
94. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 118, 11 U. S. C. 518.
95. Bankruptcy Act of.1898, § 141, 11 U. S. C. 541.
96. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 146, 11 U. S. C. 546.
97. 75 F. (2d) 284, 285 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
98. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 146, 11 U. S. C. 546.
99. 90 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); 81 F. (2d) 981 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
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"the independent trustee is the key to real reform. In comparison, the other reforms
are secondary."l ° °
Chapter X makes the appointment of such a trustee mandatory in all cases
where the liabilities total $250,000 or more.' 0 ' This is a major change wrought
by Chapter X. Under 77B it was possible to continue the debtor in possession.
This it was believed would eliminate an item of great expense and at the same
time interfere as little as possible with the smooth running of the debtor's
business. The Securities and Exchange Commission made the disinterested
trustee the crux of its program and Congress bowed to its wishes. In addition
to the distinterested trustee, the court may appoint a director, officer or employee
as a co-trustee. His duties, however, are confined to the operation of the
business' 2  Another unique, though not startling requirement is that the
trustee be competent to perform his duties. Before final confirmation the
trustee must weather a statutory hearing where objections to his availability may
be pressed by any interested parties.'0 3
The trustee is required, at the direction of the judge, to investigate the debtor's
acts, conduct, property, and financial condition, and to explore the feasibility of
continuing the business. He must report to the judge all facts pertaining to
fraud, misconduct, mismanagement or other forms of irregularity, and any
causes of action open to the estate. He may, if the judge directs, examine any
director or officer of the debtor or any other witness having knowledge concerning
the subject matter of the investigation.'0 4
One of the most important duties imposed upon a trustee concerns the role
he must play in formulating a plan of reorganization. First he must give notice
to creditors and stockholders so that they may submit to him suggestions rela-
tive to the plan.' 05 Thus the trustee's office becomes a sort of clearing house for
ideas. The trustee must then prepare a plan or report to the judge his reasons
why a plan cannot be effected.'0 0 The importance of the trustee in the initiation
of a plan is original with the Chandler Act. Under both equity receiverships and
77B the formulation of the plan fell into the hands of those whose prime
interest was salvaging something for themselves. It is the expectation of
Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission that the "disinterested"
trustee will perform this task in a disinterested manner.
Commissioner Eicker of the Securities and Exchange Commission has said
that,
"We regard the objectivity of the trustee, and incidentally of his attorney, who must
100. Hearing before Committee on the Judidary H. R. 6439 subsequently reported,
H. R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 177.
101. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 156, 11 U. S. C. 556.
102. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 156, 11 U. S. C. 556; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 189,
11 U. S. C. 589.
103. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 162, 11 U. S. C. 562.
104. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 167, 11 U. S. C. 567.
105. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 167 (6), 11 U. S. C. $67.
106. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 169, 11 U. S. C. 569.
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likewise measure up to similar standards of disinterestedness, as so vital to the proper
functioning of the Chandler Act that we have been jealous of any attempt to under-
mine the prescribed standards.' 01o7
Chapter X allots the Securities and Exchange Commission a two-fold function.
First, active participation in reorganization proceedings and secondly, the
rendition of advisory reports. In addition to cases where it is able to file
an appearance, the Securities and Exchange Commission must, in cases in-
volving more than $3,000,000, and may in cases involving less, be given an
opportunity to examine and report on the plan of reorganization.108
As a practical matter the ratio of appearances in Chapter X proceedings is
about one out of eleven. 10 9 The Securities and Exchange Commission does
not make a practice of interfering in the reorganization of small or closely held
corporations, for these are rarely affected with a public interest. Mr. J. Anthony
Panuch, Special Counsel to the Reorganization Division of the Securities and
Exchange Commission has replied to the question as to what constitutes sufficient
public interest as follows:
"Since each reorganization is in many respects sui generis, no hard and fast answer
is possible. As you know, the Commission's primary concern is the protection of the
public investor interest and, while each case necessarily depends on its own specific
considerations the Commission has adopted a sort of prima facie rule that, absent
exceptional circumstances, participation will not be sought in cases where the face
amount of the debtor's publicly held securities is less than a quarter of a million
dollars.""10
All recommendations of the Securities and Exchange Commission are of an
advisory nature. They are not binding on the courts. This should have a very
salutary effect upon all concerned.
The plan of reorganization is the ultimate goal of Chapter X. We have seen
the role played by the trustee in the promulgation of the plan and have noted
that in addition to being approved by the judge the plan must be accepted by a
certain percentage of all interested parties. The requisite percentage is fixed
at two-thirds in amount of the claims filed and allowed of each class of creditors
and in case the debtor has been found not to be insolvent, a majority of the
stockholders."' No good purpose will be served in recounting here the various
provisions that must or may be found in every plan of reorganization. They are
all set forth in Section 216 of the Act. However, of primary importance is the
injunction that no plan may be confirmed by the judge unless it is "fair,
equitable and feasible.""
12
107. Address of Edward C. Eicher before Annual Convention of American Bar Asso-
ciation-July 11, 1939.
108. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 172, 11 U. S. C. 572.
109. Address of E. C. Eicher before Annual Convention of American Bar Association
-July 11, 1939.
110. Address of J. A. Panuch before New York County Lawyers Association-Novem-
ber 21, 1939.
111. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 179, 11 U. S. C. 579.
112. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 221 (2), 11 U. S. C. 621.
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On the face of it, this precept would seem to indicate that its interpretation
lay within the sound discretion of the individual judge. But such is not the case.
The fact that all but a small percentage of the security holders have approved
the plan is not the test that determines whether a plan is a fair and equitable
one.' 1 3 Indeed a court is required to consider the fairness of the plan even
though no objections have been expressed."14 One court has held that a plan
is fair and feasible if "it is economically expedient, without discrimination or
destruction of vested rights."" 95
Under the equity receivership form of reorganization stockholders of the old
corporation frequently secured choice positions in the new, while creditors of
the former received scant attention in the latter. Then in 1913 the Supreme
Court, in the famous case of Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd,"0 enunciated with
finality what has come to be known as the "strict priority rule." Briefly stated,
Boyd was an unsecured creditor of the old corporation. Under the plan of
reorganization the old stockholders, upon advancing some money, were given a
participation in the new corporation while the unsecured creditors were passed
over. The Court allowed Boyd to follow the property of the new corporation,
which had been acquired from the old, and seek his remedy against it. In
other words as far as Boyd was concerned the Court treated the sale under the
reorganization plan as a fraudulent conveyance and set it aside.
Apparently the legal profession had difficulty in determining the implications
of the Boyd case.ll As if to reiterate its position with greater force the Supreme
Court in November of 1939 in Case v. Los Angcles Lumber Products Co. Ltd.P8
held that creditors are entitled to absolute priority over stockholders against all
the property of an insolvent corporation. The one exception which permits stock-
holders to fare better than creditors under a plan of reorganization concerns a
situation where said stockholders advance new money or money's worth and then
their participation must be based solely on this contribution and must be reason-
ably equivalent to it." 9 A finding that certain stockholders have "financial
standing and influence in the community" and can furnish a "continuity of
management" is not sufficient basis for extending them priority over creditors
in the plan of reorganization. The Supreme Court ruled that,
"such items are illustrative of a host of intangibles which, if recognized as adequate
consideration for issuance of stock to valueless junior interests, would serve as easy
evasions of the principle of full and absolute priority of Northern Pacific Railway Co.
v. Boyd, supra, and related cases."l' m
Moreover, such items,
113. 308 U. S. 106 (1939).
114. 22 F. Supp. 664 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
115. Ibid.
116. 228 U. S. 482 (1912).
117. (1939) 48 Y= L. J. 1334, 1346.
118. sos U. S. 106 (1939).
119. Id. at 121.
120. Id. at 122.
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"have no place in the asset column of the balance sheet of the new company. They
reflect merely vague hopes or possibilities." 121
Another finding that if the bondholders were to foreclose instead of allowing
the reorganization to be consummated they would receive "substantially less than
the present appraised value" of the corporation's assets, was held to be in-
sufficient grounds for extending priority to the stockholders over creditors.
"The fact that bondholders might fare worse as a result of a foreclosure, and
liquidation than they would by taking a debtor's plan under Section 77B can
have no relevant bearing on whether a propsed plan is 'fair and equitable' under
that section. Submission to coercion is not the application of 'fair and
equitable' standards.' 2
2
In order to adhere to the "strict priority" rule it is not necessary that creditors
be paid in cash as a condition precedent to the retention by the stockholders of
an interest in the reorganized corporation. "His interest can be preserved by the
issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds or preferred stock."'
12
-
Unwarranted preference for stockholders over creditors in a plan of reorganiza-
tion is not the only method of violating the "strict priority" rule. It is just as
offensive to prefer a junior class of creditors to a class senior in rank.
In passing on the plan of reorganization the judge should be ever mindful
that "the bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive powers of Congress,
is subject to the Fifth Amendment."12 4  Consequently any plan that deprives
a secured creditor of full compensation where the security is ample violates the
Fifth Amendment. 125
It would seem that the secured creditor has every reason to be grateful for
the reiteration of the "strict priority" rule in the Los Angeles Lumber case. For
apparently it not only preserves for him the full protection of his security, if he
should demand it, but at the same time it overcomes the greatest constitutional
defect in the Bankruptcy Act as it now reads. Section 77E, dealing with Rail-
road Reorganizations permits the judge to confirm the plan of reorganization,
despite the fact that it has not been accepted by the requisite percentage of
creditors and stockholders, if he is satisfied that it makes "fair and equitable"
provision for those rejecting it. Conceivably a judge may decide that in a par-
ticular case it is "fair and equitable" for a certain class of secured creditors to
take less than their security guarantees them. Under the provisions of Section
77E the judge could then confirm the plan, regardless of the fact that his action
would be violative of the Fifth Amendment, in that it deprives individuals of
their property without due process of law.
Under the provisions of Chapter X, while it is true that the judge cannot
confirm the plan without the approval of two-thirds of the creditors of each
class of securities, yet the germ of unconstitutionality is present. Taking a
121. Ibid.
122. 308 U. S. 106, 123 (1939).
123. 228 U. S. 482, 508 (1912).
124. 295 U. S. 555, 589 (1935).
125. 90 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
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hypothetical case, suppose two-thirds of the secured creditors agreed to take
less than the full amount of their security. What would be the position of the
remaining secured creditors who dissent? The Bankruptcy Act itself seems to
indicate that if the judge deemed the plan "fair and equitable", they would have
to submit. Certainly this too would be violative of the Fifth Amendment when
viewed in the light of Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford (the first
Frazier-Lemke Act case).
Congress evidently deemed the "fair and equitable" requirements of the plan
sufficient protection for individual creditors. In fact, it has turned out to be an
ample cloak of security, but only because the Supreme Court in the Los Angeles
Lumber case re~nforced the "strict priority" doctrine by holding it to be an
essential part of any fair and equitable plan. If a different theory had been
sponsored by the Court there can be little doubt but that the above mentioned
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act would have clashed with the Fifth Amendment.
When a plan of reorganization cannot be consummated, the judge shall either
dismiss the proceeding or adjudge the debtor a bankrupt. 1 0
Authority to make allowances for services rendered in the reorganization lies
exclusively with the court. It is possible for individuals, be they creditors or
stockholders, to be compensated, provided the services rendered contributed to
the affirmance or disaffirmance of the plan, or were of value in the administration
of the estate.127 Plainly the purpose intended by Congress was the encourage-
ment of participation by individuals in the creation of the plan.
I Appeals taken in reorganization proceedings are regulated, just as they were
under 77B, by the rules applicable in straight bankruptcy proceedings12- They
have, however, undergone a thorough revision.
It has been the practice of the court, at least under 77B and there is no reason
to believe Chapter X has brought about a change, to allow appeals only to
those who might be classified as parties to the litigation.'" Creditors and bond-
holders must be permitted to formally intervene before they may avail them-
selves of the right to appeal.130  A stockholder may only appeal as of right,
without permission to intervene, in questions involving the permanent appoint-
ment of trustees or the proposed confirmation of a plan of reorganization. 1 '
Under 77B the law was in an unsettled state as to whether or not leave to
appeal must be obtained from the appellate court.132 The reason assigned for
the difficulty was the necessity of following a rather nebulous distinction between
"proceedings" in bankruptcy and "controversies" arising out of bankruptcy
proceedings. The former evidently applied to matters of administration, while
the latter covered disputes occurring between the trustee and third parties who
126. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 236 (1) and (2), 11 U. S. C. 636.
127. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 243, 11 U. S. C. 643.
128. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 121, 11 U. S. C. S21.
129. 82 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1935).
130. 79 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
131. 83 F. (2d) 391 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
132. 10 Rm oGToN, BANKRupTcy (1939) 570.
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were not within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Under 77B, in a
"proceeding" in bankruptcy, an appeal could only be taken by leave of the
appellate court, unless the sum involved exceeded 500. The Chandler Act
has eradicated the distinction mentioned above, that existed under 77B, with
one exception. Now it is provided "That when any order, decree, or judgment
involves less than $500, an appeal therefrom may be taken only upon allowance
of the appellate court."'11 3  The one exception concerns interlocutory orders.
Where they are the subject of appeal the old distinction, between "proceedings"
in bankruptcy and "controversies" arising out of bankruptcy proceedings, is
pertinent.13 4 It should be noted, however, that the statute is none too clear
on this point. The language will bear interpretation.
Upon the consummation of a plan of reorganization, the judge must enter
a final decree; (1) discharging the debtor from all its debts and liabilities and
terminating all rights and interests of stockholders of the debtor, except as pro-
vided in the plan or in the order directing or authorizing the transfer of the
retention of property; (2) discharging the trustee, if any; (3) making such pro-
visions by way of injunction or otherwise as may be equitable; and (4) closing
the estate.135
Chapter XI of the Chandler Act deals with the subject of "Arrangements."
Congress defines an "arrangement" as "any plan of a debtor for the settlement,
satisfaction, or extension of the time of payment of his unsecured debts, upon
any terms." 13  Chapter XI evolved from a union of the old Sections 12 and 74.
Many new features have been added.' 3
7
Only voluntary petitions under this chapter are permitted. 13 The reason
for denying other than the debtor the right to seek an arrangement lies in the
fact that it was enacted for the benefit of debtors and not creditors. The answer
to the pertinent question as to who may be classified as a debtor is found in
Section 306 (3) where a debtor is defined as "a person who could become a
bankrupt under section 4 of this Act and who files a petition under this chapter."
Of course, the petition must state that the debtor is either insolvent or unable
to pay his debts as they mature.' 30 In addition the petition must set forth the
provisions of the arrangement proposed by the debtor.140 It is permissible for a
debtor to file a petition for arrangement either before or after his adjudication
in a pending bankruptcy proceeding' 4' or he may file his petition despite the
fact that no bankruptcy proceeding has been initiated.' 4' The Act gives the
court before whom the petition is filed exclusive jurisdiction over both the debtor
133. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 24a, 11 U. S. C. 47.
134. Ibid
135. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 227, 11 U. S. C. 627.
136. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 306 (1), 11 U. S. C. 706.
137. H. R. RF,. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 50.
138. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 321, 11 U. S. C. 721.
139. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 323, 11 U. S. C. 723.
140. Ibid.
141. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 321, 11 U. S. C. 721.
142. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 322, 11 U. S. C. 722.
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and his property, wherever located.' 43 After the petition has been filed the court
has authority, (1) to permit rejection of the executory contracts of the debtor
upon notice to interested parties; and (2) to permit the receiver, trustee, or
debtor in possession to lease or sell any of the debtor's property, whether real
or persona. 144
The district judge may refer a Chapter M proceeding entirely to a referee,14
who thus may play a role he is barred from assuming under Chapter X where
his usefulness is limited. If the court should deem it necessary, it may appoint,
upon the application of a party in interest, a receiver, or continue in office a
trustee already qualified in a bankruptcy proceeding.'4 0
The court must, as soon as expedient, call a meeting of creditors, upon ten
days' notice to the interested parties. 4 7  At this meeting the judge or referee
must preside. He may receive proofs of claim and allow or disallow them. He
must examine the debtor or cause him to be examined and hear witnesses on any
matter relevant to the proceeding. He must also receive and determine the
written acceptances of creditors on the proposed arrangement. Said acceptances
may be secured by the debtor prior to the filing of the petition." 38
The Court may divide the creditors into classes and, if a controversy arise,
summarily determine it after a hearing on notice.' 4 9
Generally speaking an arrangement must include provisions modifying or
altering the rights of unsecured creditors, either as a group, or some class of
them, upon any terms or for any consideration. 0 0 Section 357 sets forth more
specifically what provisions may be included.
Before an arrangement can be confirmed by the court it must have been
accepted by a majority in number of all the creditors, or if the creditors have
been divided into classes, a majority of each class.10
The court must confirm the arrangement if it is satisfied that, (1) the pro-
visions of Chapter XI have been complied with; (2) the arrangement is to the
best interests of the creditors; (3) it is fair and equitable and feasible; (4)
the debtor has not been guilty of any of the acts or failed to perform any of the
duties which would be a bar to the discharge of a bankrupt; and (5) the
proposal and its acceptance are in good faith and have not been made or
procured by any means, promises, or acts forbidden by the Act.'
0 -
No petition for an arrangement can be confirmed if the debtor has been
granted a discharge in bankruptcy within six years or has had an arrangement by
143. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 311, 11 U. S. C. 711.
144. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 313, 11 U. S. C. 713.
145. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 331, 11 U. S. C. 731.
146. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 332, 11 U. S. C. 732.
147. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 334, 11 U. S. C. 734.
148. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 336, 11 U. S. C. 736.
149. Bankruptcy Act of 1893, § 351, 11 U. S. C. 751.
150. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 356, 11 U. S. C. 756.
151. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 362, 11 U. S. C. 762.
152. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 366, 11 U. S. C. 766.
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way of composition during the same period.'
The provisions listed above are, I believe, the highlights of Chapter XI,
excluding such provisions as are repetitious of what was discussed under Chapter
X. Far from partaking of the intricate nature of Chapter X, Chapter XI is,
just what it was meant to be, a quick, inexpensive method of composition for
debtors who have outstanding unsecured obligations.
There can be little doubt but that it was the intention of the authors of
Chapter XI (and it is chiefly the brain-child of the National Association of
Credit Men) that it would be used only by small corporations.154 Yet there is
nothing in the Chapter which excludes debtors from availing themselves of it
because of their size. Naturally the management of a debtor would prefer to
come into a court of bankruptcy under Chapter XI instead of under Chapter X.
Under the former chapter the debtor can avoid the mandatory appointment of a
trustee in cases where its assets exceed $250,000. The debtor in control is the
rule rather than the exception under Chapter XI. It is the debtor who propounds
the plan of arrangement and the creditors sole function is the acceptance or
rejection of said plan.155 Again the Securities and Exchange Commission d6es
not play as important a role in an arrangement as it does in the case of a
corporate reorganization. It may not on its own make an investigation for the
benefit of the court. Still another important advantage of Chapter XI from the
viewpoint of the debtor is the fact that he may secure acceptances of his
proposed arangement from a majority of his creditors prior to approval of the
plan by the court. This constitutes a pre-judging of the fairness of the arrange-
ment by a majority of those who stand to gain or lose most by its consumma-
tion. While a court may still refuse to confirm the plan this prior acceptance
constitutes pressure that is not desirable.
The outstanding example of a large corporation with widely held securities
attempting to avail itself of Chapter XI, is the case of In re United States Realty
and Improvement Company.'5" The district court and the circuit court of
appeals believed the company to be within its legal rights when it sought an
arrangement with respect to its unsecured obligations. The United States
Supreme Court 157 in a five to three decision reversed the lower courts and held
that Chapter XI was not a proper vehicle of judicial relief for a company of the
size of the U. S. Realty.
Mr. Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion, points out that the S. E. C.'s
argument against the use of Chapter XI by the U. S. Realty is based on a
contention that
153. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 371, 11 U. S. C. 771; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 14c
(5), 11 U. S. C. 32.
154. Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary, H. R. 6439 subsequently reported,
H. R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 36.
155. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 306 (1), 11 U. S. C. 706; Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
§ 323, 11 U. S. C. 723; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 357, 11 U. S. C. 757.
156. 108 F. (2d) 794 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1940).
157. 310 U. S. 434 (1940).
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"Congress intended the more detailed and cumbersome procedure of Chapter X to
apply wherever securities of the corporation were held by the public, whereas Chapter
XI was intended to apply only in the case of individuals or corporations not having
such securities outstanding."
The Justice goes on to say that,
"The Act will be searched in vain for any hint of such a distinction."
The language of Chapter XI is very dear. The words used are not ambiguous.
Nor indeed did Mr. Justice Stone, writing the majority opinion attempt to base
his opinion on any such ambiguity. He held that,
"the case stated most favorably to respondent is that it has prepared an arrangement
which appears on its face not to be 'fair and equitable' and hence not to be entitled
to confirmation under Chapter XI."
This would all be very well if the court had been reviewing a determination of
the district court that the plan of arrangement was "fair and equitable." But
this was not the situation. The Supreme Court was reviewing a determination
by the district court that the petition under Chapter XI had been properly
filed. The district court never reached a point in its control of the proceed-
ings where it ruled on the merits of the plan. The distinction is clear and
important. For all that is necessary for the filing of a petition to be approved,
is that the petitioner has rigidly adhered to the literal requirements of Chapter
XI. This it concededly did. The plan could have been amended later. The
equities of the situation are determined subsequent to the filing of the petition.
Few can deny that the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in the U. S.
Realty case was desirable. Clearly Chapter X is more acceptable than Chapter
XI as a vehicle for the readjustment of a large corporation's financial burden.
But there are many who do differ with the majority of the court because they
question the propriety of the court's enacting a little judicial legislation.
Since the effect of the Supreme Court decision in the U. S. Really case is to
deny a party relief under Chapter XI, when any reasonable review of the
Chapter will dearly indicate that the respondent has followed the "letter of the
law", it is not going too far afield to point out that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that where the language of a statute is unambiguous any
judicial construction which adds to or subtracts from what is written, is not
permitted. In Oscha v. United States, 300 U. S. 98, 101, the Court wrote,
"and in penal statutes, as in those of a different character, 'if the language be dear, it
is conclusive.'"
Again, in Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 83, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in
more august language, expresses a similar view. The following, from Mr. Justice
Brandeis' opinion in Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245, 250, 251, and again
quoted by him in Wallace v. Cutten, 298 U. S. 229, 237, is particularly appro-
priate in a discussion as to whether or not Chapter XI was the proper statutory
vehicle for the U. S. Realty Company:
"The statute was evidently drawn with care. Its language is plain and unambiguous.
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What the government asks is not a construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlarge-
ment of it by the court, so that what was omitted, presumably (possibly) by
inadvertence may be included within its scope. To supply omissions transcends the
judicial function."
Whether or not it would be well to permit our courts to enlarge upon legislation
when they deem it advisable is a question outside the ken of this paper.
Chapter XII, entitled Real Property Arrangements by Persons other than
Corporation, was enacted for the purpose of aiding "the 'little fellow' who is
neither a farmer, nor a railroad, nor a business corporation, nor a taxing
agency."' 58
Congress believed that it was in the interest of the simplification of the
"judicial machinery" to place arrangements affecting unsecured debts and debts
secured by real property or chattels real in different chapters of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.159 As under the other "Debtor-Relief" sections of the Chandler Act
no adjudication as a bankrupt is necessary before one may seek relief under this
chapter. Thus the so-called stigma of bankruptcy is obviated.
Chapter XIII is concerned with the relief of wage-earners. Indeed wage-
earners seem to be the special favorites of Congressmen when they set about
passing bankruptcy legislation. Under Section 4a of the Act a wage-earner is
permitted to file a voluntary petition regardless of his financial position. How-
ever, under 4B of the Act an involuntary petition may not be filed against him
unless his earnings exceed $1,500 a year. Despite this Congressional interest
in his welfare it seems that as a practical matter adequate relief had heretofore
been denied him. For example, under old Section 12, which allowed composi-
tions, a court of bankruptcy could not retain jurisdiction subsequent to the
confirmation of a composition. A wage-earner is rarely in a position to make
any settlement that is not predicated on future earnings. So at the very time
when the composition agreement was of some substantive value to creditors, the
court lacked jurisdiction. With the advent of Section 74 in 1933 it was thought
that a wage-earner could obtain relief under it. But again as a practical matter
such was not the case. For Section 74 required that the debtor deposit in
advance in cash the cost of the proceedings, and for those whose sole chance of
meeting obligations lay in the future it was a valueless remedy.
It is interesting to note that while Chapter XIII allows unsecured creditors
to be dealt with as a class, secured creditors must be dealt with individually.100
This distinction it is pointed out by the House Committee on the Judiciary "is
made necessary by the decision of Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rad-
ford." ' 1 In this case,'0 2 it will be recalled, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated the first A. A. A. on the ground that it violated the Fifth Amendment
158, 7 RmnGToN, BANxRUpTcY (1939) 311.
159. Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary, H. R. 6439 subsequently re-
ported H. R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 51.
160. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 652 (1), 11 U. S. C. 1052.
161. HousE HFaPuJNs, op. cit. supra note 159, at 54.
162. 295 U. S. 55 (1934).
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in that it deprived creditors of rights in specific property acquired prior to the
passage of the law.
It is now necessary that every wage-earner plan of arrangement contain a
provision that the debtor will cause his future earnings to come under the
supervision and control of the court.16a This overcomes one of the dis-
advantages of old Section 12.
The fourteenth chapter of the Bankruptcy Act dealing with "Mlaritime Com-
mission Liens" is the work of the Maritime Commission. Its purpose is to
assure the continued operation of this nation's ships in foreign commerce.
In brief it permits a court of bankruptcy, equity or admiralty to designate the
Commission as sole trustee, with its consent, for any corporation operating
vessels of United States registry in foreign commerce, upon which the United
States holds mortgages, if it believes that it will inure to the benefit of the estate
and other parties in interest and that it will tend to further the purpose of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936. In such proceedings the appointment of any
person other than the Commission does not become final until ratified by said
Commission.'6 4
The next section gives the Court authority to allow the Commission to operate
such vessels in foreign commerce where the court is unwilling to permit the
trustee or receiver to so operate them pending the termination of the proceed-
ings. First, however, the Commission must certify that the continued operation
of the vessels is necessary.165
The final section of Chapter XIV merely provides that no injunctive powers
vested in courts of bankruptcy apply to the United States as a creditor under a
preferred ship mortgage unless the Commission waives in writing the provisions
of this section.' 66
Chapter XV, the most recent major addition to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
deals with "Railroad Adjustments." Strictly speaking it is not a part of the
Chandler Act, having been enacted into law subsequent to June 22, 1938.
In brief, any railroad corporation which has not been the subject of an
equity receivership or been in process of reorganization under Section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act during the ten years prior to the filing of its petition, is entitled
to file said petition, providing certain conditions have been met. These condi-
tions include a requirement that the Interstate Commerce Commission issue an
order authorizing the financing contained in the proposed plan of adjustment,
based upon certain findings of fact which must be included in said order. It is
also necessary that the railroad secure assents to the plan of adjustment by
creditors representing more than two-thirds of the aggregate amount of all the
claims affected by the plan. The two-thirds must include at least a majority of
the total amount of claims in each affected class. In addition the railroad must
set forth in its petition a statement to the effect that it is unable to meet its
163. Bankruptcy Act of 1S98, § 646 (4), 11 U. S. C. 1046.
164. Bankruptcy Act of 1S98, § 701, 11 U. S. C. 1101.
165. Bankruptcy Act of 189S, § 702, 11 U. S. C. 1102.
166. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 703, 11 U. S. C. 1103.
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debts, matured or about to mature, and that it desires to carry out the plan of
adjustment. Further "it must appear that the railroad corporation's inability
to meet its debts matured or about to mature is reasonably expected to be
temporary only."' 67
It is interesting to note that all proceedings under Chapter XV must be con-
ducted before a special three-judge court convened for that purpose. An appeal
from any final order or decree of this court is taken direct to the United States
Supreme Court.
The jurisdiciion conferred by Chapter XV terminates on July 31, 1940, except
in respect of any proceeding initiated by filing a petition prior to that date.
Evaluation of the Chandler Act-Changes That Have Been Recommended
I do not believe that one can adequately appraise the Chandler Act by just
picking up the finished product and reading it. The proper perspective, it seems
to me, is obtained by viewing it as a piece of legislation that has evolved from
centuries of experience in bankruptcy law both in this country and abroad. It is
for this reason that I prefaced my discussion of the Act itself with an historical
r~sum6 calculated to indicate the origin and purposes of various concepts that
have now become fixed in our bankruptcy jurisprudence.
A period of little more than two years is hardly sufficient in which to pass
final judgment on the real value of the Chandler Act. It is not the type of
legislation that meets instantaneously with either popular approval or dis-
approval. Many of its most important features have yet to be "tried by fire."
Particularly is this so with regard to Chapter X, dealing with corporate
reorganization.
The Fifth Annual Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission trans-
mitted to Congress on January 3, 1940 sets forth certain statistics with regard to
corporate reorganizations for the period running from June 22, 1938 until June
30, 1939. It shows for example that during said period 577 companies, with
total assets of approximately $527,000,000, availed themselves of Chapter X.108
Such figures I do not consider particularly significant, for the real value of
remedial legislation cannot be judged by the number of "patients" it secures,
but rather by the number of "cures" it effects. The period of "convalescence",
required for the average corporation undergoing a reorganization, is, un-
fortunately, of long duration.
If one were to say that the Chandler Act represents a substantial improvement
over prior bankruptcy legislation, I do not believe he would be guilty of mere
speculation. Those who formulated the amendatory act did so fully conscious
of defects plainly apparent in the then existing law. They set about their task
of streamlining the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 with the avowed purpose of over-
coming said defects. The remedies they suggested were not haphazardly con-
ceived but represented the fruits of earnest and learned endeavor. Only the
inexperienced or the fool would contend that the Chandler Act is the perfect
167. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, et al., D. C. E. D. Pa., No. 21011.
168. STH AiiuAL REPORT or TnE SECURnuns AND EXCHANGE CoNiSSION (1939) 266.
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form of bankruptcy law. Already many suggestions have been advanced to
further refine it and make it a better instrument of justice. Whether or not they
in turn will withstand the scrutiny of a discerning bar remains to be seen.
The following are just a few of the proposed changes in the Chandler Act
that have received consideration. Most of them have been incorporated in bills
advanced either in the Senate or in the House of Representatives. Where or
how they originated is not really important. Their substance is what should
interest those concerned with the future of bankruptcy legislation.
(1) Should a general assignment for the benefit of creditors constitute an act
of bankruptcy? It has been suggested that it should bear weight only when
joined with another act of bankruptcy.
To answer the question first, it would appear that it is sound judgment to
include a general assignment for the benefit of creditors within the acts of
bankruptcy. It is a necessary compliment to those provisions that make
fraudulent conveyances and preferences also acts of bankruptcy. A general
assignment is simply an attempt on the part of a debtor to place his assets without
the pale of the bankruptcy law. The temptation to benefit a favorite creditor is
apparent. To follow the suggestion that a general assignment should only bear
weight when joined with another act of bankruptcy, would in effect mean the
abolition of the general assignment as an act of bankruptcy. The presence of
the other "act" would in itself be sufficient cause for the filing of an involuntary
petition in bankruptcy.
If the general assignment field was left to the states you might have confusion
arising from differing state statutory provisions. Probably the provisions would
attempt to prefer resident creditors in each state over non-resident creditors.
However the act of bankruptcy committed where a preference occurs would still
be effective and the victimized creditors could bring the matter over into federal
bankruptcy proceedings under this act of bankruptcy.
(2) As we have already noted there are those who consider the Acts of
Bankruptcy antiquated. Would it be better to substitute "a general inability
to meet current obligations" as a prerequisite for bringing an involuntary petition
into a court of bankruptcy?
Before criticizing too strongly the Acts of Bankruptcy it would be well to
consider the role they are epected to play. The problem involved is well
illustrated, by the author of a book on English Bankruptcy Law, in the following
words:
"The task of weaving a mesh coarse enough to let the honest man through, but fine
enough to catch the scoundrel has proved to be one of extraordinary difficulty."Iu O
The "Acts of Bankruptcy" are not the perfect "mesh", but it would appear that
they represent a more logical answer to the problem than the equitable insolvency
test suggested above. In periods of economic depression it is not uncommon
for men to be unable to meet their current obligations. Their "frozen assets"
at a fair valuation might well be more than sufficient to pay their debts as they
169. R GWOOD, BA.xruP'cY LAW (17th ed. 1936) 1.
19401
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
mature. Clearly under this plan the mesh would not be coarse enough to let
the honest man through. If, on the other hand, legal insolvency were sub-
stituted for the Acts of Bankruptcy, the mesh would not be fine enough to
catch the scoundrel. For it would then be possible for a debtor, whose assets
exceeded his liabilities at a particular time, to transfer certain possessions to
accomplices, so as to preserve them unto himself when in the near future his
liabilities exceed his assets. It would seem somewhat harsh to permit momen-
tary insolvency to be the basis for the involuntary petition. The fairer pro-
vision would require insolvency for a stated time, but that presents a great
burden of proof if it is to rest upon the creditors.
(3) It has been urged that Section 3d should be amended so that the burden
of proving solvency would always be on the debtor. This suggestion is not
without merit. However, it should be borne in mind that such a change would
run contra to one of our firmest rules of evidence, namely that the burden of
proof is placed upon the proponent of a legal proposition. The present section
places on the debtor the burden of going forward with the evidence through the
production of his books, papers, and accounts. In the event he fails to so go
forward with the evidence, the burden of proof is placed upon him.
(4) At present a debtor is entitled to a jury trial on the question of his
solvency. It has been proposed that the debtor be denied a jury trial in such
a case. The suggestion is worthy of adoption, for after all the issue of solvency
is best determined by resort to accounting methods.
(5) The element of intent is now an essential factor in determining whether
or not certain actions on the part of a debtor constitute a preference and thus
an act of bankruptcy. It has been contended that in reality a preference is a
preference and intent is difficult to prove. It would appear that this suggestion
has some substance and is worthy of Congresional attention. Further, it is to
be borne in mind that at present creditors have two helpful presumptions aiding
them to sustain the burden imposed upon them. The defendant is presumed to
know his own financial condition and he is further presumed to intend the
ordinary consequences of his acts.
(6) Unsecured creditors naturally dislike the fact that they must bear the
entire burden of administration expenses. They would like to see the secured
creditors share their financial obligations. But such a provision could not be
retroactive in effect and comply with constitutional requirements. A secured
creditor has a right to proceed against the security in order to satisfy the debt
owed to him. This having been accomplished, he has little interest in the fate
of a fellow creditor, who failed to exact security.
(7) Repeatedly it has been urged that Congress clearly define the "boundary
line" between Chapter X and Chapter XI proceedings. Some may claim that
the Supreme Court has already done this in its United States Realty opinion.
However, there is good reason to believe that the Court did not formulate a
general rule. Conceding that it did hold that, a large corporation with nine
hundred creditors and seven thousand stockholders, could not formulate a plan
of arrangement under Chapter XI that would be "fair and equitable", the
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question arises as to what is the maximum number of creditors and stockholders
that would allow of a "fair and equitable" arrangement. Apparently each debtor
will be considered sui generis by the courts. Plainly this is a fertile field for
Congressional action.
That so many and varied amendments (those listed above represent but a
small percentage of the total) have been proposed in the short period that has
elapsed since the Chandler Act was passed, is, I believe, indicative not of the
inadequacy of the law but rather of the untiring efforts of those who seek to
forge the most perfect weapon possible to combat the spread of economic distress.
